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The Federal Role in Managing the
Nation’s Groundwater
By John D. Leshy1
1
I. Introduction
Groundwater is increasingly important
to the nation.  Groundwater withdrawals for
irrigation have tripled in the last half-cen-
tury.  Moreover, as an ever-growing segment
of the population get their drinking water
from public entities (62% in 1950; 85% to-
day), the portion of public water supplies
derived from groundwater has increased
from 26% to 37%.2
Groundwater nevertheless remains a
subject about which “misinformation, mis-
understanding, and mysticism”3  abound,
and the law that governs it is murky.4   Most
of the governing law is state law, for the
separate states have generally assumed pri-
mary responsibility for managing the
nation’s groundwater.5   But “primary” does
not mean “exclusive.”  The federal govern-
ment has a large amount of authority in this
area, and has on occasion exercised it, albeit
with mixed results, as this article will discuss.
1. Harry Sunderland Distinguished Profes-
sor of Law, U.C. Hastings College of the Law.
This paper grew out of remarks delivered in June
2004 at the 25th summer conference of the Natu-
ral Resources Law Center at the University of
Colorado School of Law.  I benefited from able
research assistance by Chris Giovinazzo, a third
year student at Harvard Law School, and able
editorial advice from Avinash Kar.
2. SUSAN S. HUTSON ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SUR-
VEY, ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES IN
2000, CIRCULAR NO. 1268, at Trends in Water Use,
1950-2000 (released March 2004, last revised May
2004), available at http://water.usgs.gov/pubs/circ/
2004/circ1268 (last updated 13 May, 2004); see
also JOSEPH L. SAX, BARTON THOMPSON, JR., JOHN D.
LESHY & ROBERT ABRAMS, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER
RESOURCES 345 (3rd ed. 2000).
3. See NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLI-
CIES FOR THE FUTURE 230 (1973) [hereinafter WATER
POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE].
4. See generally SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 343-459.
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State law generally has not been ad-
equate to the task of managing the nation’s
groundwater.  Professor Glennon has recently
documented many emerging problems,
mostly stemming from inadequate state laws
and management.6   As population growth,
drought and the specter of climate change
are all bringing water management under
new scrutiny across the country, a fresh ex-
amination of the national government’s role
with respect to groundwater seems appro-
priate.  The first part of this essay identifies
the various ways the federal government can
influence groundwater management.  Build-
ing on examples of successful federal inter-
ventions, the second part suggests ways it
should exercise that influence.
II. Federal Authority Over Groundwater
Generally speaking, the federal govern-
ment does not lack for constitutional author-
ity to regulate or otherwise influence ground-
water management and use.  The Supreme
Court’s 1982 decision in Sporhase v. Nebraska7
made clear that the Commerce Clause gives
Congress “affirmative power . . . to imple-
ment its own policies concerning [ground-
water] regulation. . . . Ground water over-
draft is a national problem and Congress
has the power to deal with it on that scale.”8
A. Federal reserved water rights
The Commerce Clause and the Prop-
erty Clause both furnish the national gov-
ernment with the authority to create federal-
law-based property rights in groundwater
under the so-called Winters doctrine of fed-
eral reserved water rights.9  The issue that
occasionally arises is whether, in any given
situation, this authority has been exercised.
In its only brush with such a question, the
Court in 1976 decided, in Cappaert v. United
States,10  that the federal government had ex-
ercised its authority to reserve water in what
everyone agreed was an “underground pool.”
Oddly, the Court shrank from characterizing
that water as groundwater as the Ninth Cir-
cuit had,11 calling it instead surface water.12
Lower court post-Cappaert decisions on
whether the federal government has reserved
groundwater in particular instances have not
been consistent.  The Wyoming Supreme
Court found no reservation in its Big Horn
decision,13  justifying its conclusion with a
decidedly weird explanation.  It first said that
“the logic which supports a reservation of
surface water to fulfill the purpose of the res-
ervation also supports reservation of ground-
water.”14   It then said, without further expla-
nation, that because no final judicial deci-
sion had accepted this logic in a holding (the
Supreme Court’s dodge in Cappaert having
wiped out the Ninth Circuit’s decision), it
would affirm the trial court’s ruling that
groundwater had not been reserved here.15
6. ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER
PUMPING AND THE FATE OF AMERICA’S FRESH WATERS (2002).
7. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
8. Id. at 953-54.
9. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908);
see also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597-98 (1963)
(expressing “no doubt about the power of the
United States under these clauses to reserve water
rights for its reservations and property”).
10. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
11. See United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313,
317 (9th Cir. 1974).
12. 426 U.S. at 142.
13. In Re General Adjudication of Big Horn River System,
753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), aff’d by an equally divided Court
sub nom. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).














More recently, the Arizona and Montana
Supreme Courts, using more persuasive rea-
soning, have disagreed with Wyoming.16
Further, Congress itself has acted on the as-
sumption that at least some Indian tribes
have federally reserved rights to groundwa-
ter, because a number of congressionally
approved settlements of Indian water rights
have expressly included groundwater as well
as surface water.17  Sometimes Congress has
demonstrated this assumption by doing the
opposite, i.e., by expressly authorizing the
pumping of groundwater from inside a fed-
erally protected area for use outside the res-
ervation under certain conditions.18
Professor Dan Tarlock concludes that
while the issue is “technically open,” in his
judgment “little, if any, doubt remains that In-
dian tribes have groundwater as well as sur-
face water rights.”19   It is perhaps a little less
clear whether this is true for other kinds of fed-
eral reservations such as national parks.20
Regardless of whether the federal re-
served water right extends to groundwater in
any given situation, the Cappaert decision es-
tablishes the very important principle that “the
United States can protect its water from sub-
sequent diversion, whether the diversion is of
surface or groundwater.”21   The water Cappaert
was pumping was clearly considered ground-
water under Nevada water law,22  and the Court
curtailed his pumping to protect the superior
federal water right in the “underground pool”
that was the pupfish’s sole habitat.23   At the
least, then, the Court has made clear that the
federal government can create federal water
rights that trump groundwater pumping law-
ful under state law.  Put slightly differently,
when federal reserved rights exist, federal law
provides for a realistic accounting of intercon-
nections between groundwater and surface
water, even where state law does not.24
B. Federal “non-reserved” water rights
The federal power to assert rights in
groundwater does not have to be exercised
through a conventional federal reserved
Winters right.  For example, Congress pro-
vided federal protection for the water — in-
cluding the groundwater — that sustains a
complex sand dunes ecosystem in the Great
Sand Dunes National Park and Preserve Act
of 2000,25  not in association with a federal
reservation of land, but through a “non-re-
served” federal water right.26   This is a right
whose substantive contours are defined by
federal law, but which must be perfected
through the processes of state law.27   I have
elsewhere explored the differences between
this and a federal reserved water right.28
16. In Re General Adjudication of Gila River System, 195
Ariz. 411, 989 P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1999), cert. denied sub
nom. Phelps Dodge v. United States, 530 U.S. 1250 (2000);
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reser-
vation v. Stults, 312 MONT. 420, 59 P.3d 1093, 1099 (2002).
17. See, e.g., Timbisha Shoshone Homeland
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-423, 114 Stat. 1875 (2000);
Zuni Indian Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act,
Pub. L. No. 108-34, 117 Stat. 782 (2003).
18. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 460z-9(a) (2000 & Supp. II
2003) [Oregon Sand Dunes National Recreation Area].
19.A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND
RESOURCES, § 9.41, at 9.80-9.80.1 (5th ed. 2002).
20.See Section IIC2
21.426 U.S. at 143.
22.See id. at 133-35.
23.Id. at 132.
24.See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 443-46; John
D. Leshy & James Belanger, Arizona Law Where
Ground and Surface Water Meet, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 657,
733-38 (1988).
25.Pub. L. No. 106-530, 114 Stat. 2527; 16
U.S.C. § 4210hhh-7(b)(2)(A) (2000).
26.For more on this, see John D. Leshy, Wa-
ter Rights for New Federal Land Conservation Programs:
A Turn-of-the-Century Evaluation, 4 U. DENV. WATER
L. REV. 271 (2001).
27.Id.
28.Id.
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C. Questions about federal water rights
While the national government has the
authority to create and protect property
rights in groundwater as a matter of federal
law, a number of important questions re-
main unanswered.  For example:
1.  Does the existence of a federal res-
ervation of groundwater depend on whether
groundwater is needed to fulfill the purpose
of the reservation?
2.  Could the answer be different in In-
dian and non-Indian contexts?  The needs of
Indian and non-Indian land reservations might
not be congruent.  Non-Indian federal reser-
vations need groundwater mostly for in situ
uses, to preserve surface waters and the eco-
systems that depend on them.  Indian reser-
vations may need groundwater not only for
these uses, but also for irrigation, municipal
and industrial purposes.  Dean Charlie Meyers
suggested, for example, that a national park
may have no reserved right in groundwater to
meet its needs, while an Indian tribe does.29
3.  If the federal right extends to ground-
water as well as surface water, but both sources
need not be relied upon to satisfy the federal
need, should one be preferred over the other?
In a rare judicial exploration of this issue, the
Arizona Supreme Court suggested looking first
to surface water to satisfy Indian water needs.30
4.  Where federal and non-federal rights
co-exist in a non- or minimally recharging
aquifer, how should the aquifer water be
apportioned?  Does the federal right fore-
stall any new pumping that could interfere
with the federal reservation, or should the
finite groundwater in the aquifer be shared
between federal and non-federal users on
some sort of equitable basis?  More than
four decades ago, the Supreme Court re-
jected the states’ argument for equitable
apportionment of surface water between
federal and non-federal users, saying a fed-
eral land  “reservation is [not] so much like
a State that its rights to water should be
determined by the doctrine of equitable
apportionment.”31   Would the Court reach
the same result in the groundwater context?
5.  What if non-federal pumping were
already underway when the federal reserva-
tion was created? The Cappaerts had be-
gun pumping only after the federal reserva-
tion was created.32   Would the result be the
same if they had been pumping first?  What
if the impact of their pumping on the un-
derground pool was not apparent when the
federal reservation was created, but became
noticeable only some time later?
Will the answer be governed or influenced
by state law?  If so, the picture becomes even
more cloudy.  In a state applying the prior ap-
propriation doctrine to groundwater, the se-
quence of appropriation may be a major fac-
tor in reconciling the federal right with rights
created under state law.  Priority is, however,
irrelevant in determining rights among those
who withdraw groundwater for use on the
overlying land pursuant to the groundwater
doctrines followed in many states, e.g., the rule
of capture followed in Texas,33  the American
“reasonable use” rule followed in parts of Ari-
zona and many other states,34  and the cor-
relative rights doctrine followed in California.35
In these jurisdictions (which comprise a sig-
nificant majority of American states), a late-
comer may not be disadvantaged.  Therefore,
if the United States reserves land that needs
29. See Charles J. Meyers, Federal Groundwater
Rights: A Note on Cappaert v. United States, 13 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 377, 385-89 (1978).
30. See Gila River, 195 Ariz. 411, 420-21, 989
P.2d 739, 748-49 (2001).
31. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 596-97 (1963).
32. See 426 U.S. at 133.
33. See Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of America,
Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999).
34. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 371-77.













groundwater for in situ use, it can make a cred-
ible case for some protection under state law,
even against pumping initiated by others prior
to the reservation.36
6.  Perhaps the most important of the
unanswered questions is whether the United
States will have the political courage to assert
federal rights to curtail or prohibit pumping
under state law in controversial situations.  In
the late 1990s, a well-connected private en-
trepreneur proposed to pump groundwater
near the Mojave National Preserve in south-
ern California, and market it to urban users in
metropolitan Los Angeles.37   Although that
scheme, referred to as the Cadiz project, was
eventually abandoned when the Metropoli-
tan Water District decided not to buy the wa-
ter, others are on the drawing board.  For ex-
ample, Las Vegas has announced plans to
pump and transport into the City groundwa-
ter from near a National Wildlife Refuge sev-
eral miles northeast of the City.38   Will the fed-
eral government assert a federal reserved right
to protect groundwater necessary to maintain
the Refuge, even if it might limit one means of
supplying water to the fastest growing metro-
politan area in the country?  In such situations,
how realistic is it to expect the federal govern-
ment to aggressively protect the national in-
terest in the Refuge?  If it does not, there is
considerable doubt that third parties can per-
suade the courts to intervene.39
In hindsight, Cappaert was a rather easy case:
The facts were clear about the impact of pump-
ing on the federal interest, an endangered spe-
cies was involved,40  and the rancher commenced
pumping after the federal government had re-
served the water in the pool.  Where the impacts
are less clear, the federal interest less certain,
and the forces behind groundwater pumping
more politically powerful, will federal law be
brought into play, especially now that the Su-
preme Court has turned rightward and become
more deferential to state water law?41
D. United States’ claims of rights to
groundwater under state law
Many states apply groundwater doc-
trines — principally American reasonable
use and correlative rights (but not prior ap-
propriation) — that give overlying landown-
ers superior rights to groundwater against
those who pump from the same source but
seek to export the water, if the overlying
landowners can show injury.42   If an aquifer
lies under both federal and non-federal
lands, state law might allow the United
States to protect the waters associated with
its lands against export schemes such as
those in the Cadiz or Las Vegas situations.
I have suggested above that, especially out-
side the Indian context, the federal interest
will often be to protect groundwater in situ to
support surface ecosystems and water flows.
36. See discussion, infra Section II.D.
37. See generally Cadiz Groundwater Storage
and Dry-Year Supply Program (web-site spon-
sored by Cadiz, Inc.), at  http://
www.desertwater.com/ (last updated Dec. 2003).
38. See generally the longer-range plans of
the Southern Nevada Water Authority, available
at http://www.snwa.com/html/news_pubs_
wr_plan.html (last visited August 21, 2004).
39. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (federal
courts are reluctant to interfere with federal agency
law enforcement decisions); Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v.
Reno, 56 F. 3d 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same, specifically
with regard to assertion of water rights claims on
behalf of tribes); cf. Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Department of
Agriculture, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Colo. 2004) (sug-
gesting federal courts will scrutinize federal land man-
agement agencies’ alleged failure to claim adequate
water rights to protect a national park).
40. The Endangered Species Act itself was not
involved, even though the pupfish had been listed
under the Act, a fact noted by the lower courts but
not the Supreme Court. See United States v. Cappaert,
375 F. Supp. 456, 460-61 (D. Nev. 1974); United States
v. Cappaert, 508 F. 2d 313, 316 (9th Cir. 1974).
41.See, e.g., California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645
(1978); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
42. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 371-80.











Volume 11, Number 1
State law may be unclear on the extent
to which it recognizes rights to groundwa-
ter in situ, for storage or ecological purposes,
and whether ecological harm from ground-
water depletion is the kind of “injury” that
state law would recognize as sufficient to
curtail groundwater pumping for export.
Answering these questions in the affirma-
tive may require stretching state law con-
cepts of injury, and the attitude of the Wyo-
ming Supreme Court in the Big Horn case43
illustrates how some state courts may be
reluctant to interpret state laws to accom-
modate and protect federal interests.
E. Other federal regulatory policies
may affect groundwater
The most prominent of these are found
in the Endangered Species Act,44  already
the trigger for several major disputes involv-
ing groundwater pumping,45  and the Clean
Water Act.46
F. Federal water contracting policies
may affect groundwater
The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (BOR)
captures, stores, and delivers, under con-
tract, large volumes of irrigation, municipal
and industrial water throughout the West.
The “rights” to this water are determined by
an untidy amalgam of federal contract law,
federal water law, and state water law.47   A
good deal of this federal reclamation project
water ends up as groundwater through seep-
age.48   Are there federal rights in this feder-
ally enhanced groundwater?
The question, again, is not one of au-
thority, but whether the federal government
has chosen to exercise it.  The Supreme
Court long ago decided that the United
States could recapture and reuse seepage
water in a federal reclamation project.49
Sometimes the federal government does
claim rights in the enhanced groundwater,
as in the Quincy-Columbia Basin in Wash-
ington, and the courts have agreed.50   But
the United States has not always made such
claims.  Indeed, some of BOR’s contracts
expressly disclaim any right to groundwater
recharged as a result of federally built and
operated projects.51
Many BOR contracts go even further.
At the behest of the agricultural interests it
serves, BOR has often included a provision
in its contracts that any land irrigated with
groundwater which “reaches the under-
ground strata as an unavoidable result of” irri-
gating lands with BOR-supplied water is not
subject to the acreage limitations of federal
reclamation law. 52   Reclamation law gener-
ally limits a single farmer’s use of federally
subsidized water to a maximum of 960
acres;53  the contract provision effectively
allows farmers to irrigate an unlimited
amount of acres with such water, simply by
43. See 753 P.2d 76; see also discussion, supra
Section II.A.
44. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (2000 & Supp. II 2003).
45. See, e.g., the Edwards Aquifer saga, re-
counted in SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 367, 577-82.
46. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000 & Supp. I 2002).
47. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 651-89.
48. See Jensen v. Department of Ecology, 102 Wash.
2d 109, 685 P.2d 1068 (1984)
49. Ide v. United States, 263 U.S. 497, 505-07
(1924).  The Court did not make clear whether
that result was dictated by state or federal law
or both.  Although Ide involved seepage which
was recaptured while it was surface water, the
same result could obtain with groundwater.
50. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 437-46;
Jensen, 102 Wash. 2d 109; Flint v. United States, 906
F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1990).
51. For a review, see SAX ET AL., supra note 2,
at 443-44.
52. See id. at 444 (emphasis added).
53. See 43 U.S.C. § 390dd, 96 Stat. 1265;
Hamilton Candee, The Broken Promise of Reclama-













pumping it from an aquifer replenished by
the federal project.
G. Federal land use policies may affect
groundwater
Groundwater use that is otherwise lawful
under state law may also be affected by federal
policies regarding the use of federal land.
Groundwater extraction, storage and
recovery projects sometimes require rights-
of-way across federal lands.  The federal
government usually has broad discretion to
grant or deny such rights-of-way.  Numer-
ous court decisions make clear that the fed-
eral government can condition such permits
on steps being taken to protect federal in-
terests.54   It seems clear that the federal land
manager can condition permission to use
the federal land upon an agreement by the
permittee to limit groundwater pumping that
is otherwise lawful under state law.
While the law is clear, the politics are
complicated, and such conditions can be
controversial.  This is the groundwater ver-
sion of the “bypass flows” controversy that
has, for nearly two decades, plagued Forest
Service efforts to use its land use permit-
ting authority to protect and restore surface
water flows in the national forests which
have been depleted by non-federal diver-
sions taking place on federal land under
state water law.55
H. Interstate issues
The federal common law of equitable
apportionment, along with compacts and
statutes that apply to interstate water-
courses, may also operate to restrict use of
groundwater in a variety of circumstances.56
For example, the Special Master in Arizona v.
California indicated at one point that he was
prepared to enjoin additional groundwater
pumping in New Mexico where its effect would
be to deplete surface water flow earmarked
for senior water right holders in Arizona.57
To sum up, the federal government has
potentially enormous power — through a
variety of means — to influence groundwa-
ter management throughout the country, and
especially in the West where much land is
federally owned and many stream systems
contain federal reclamation water projects.
III. The Federal Role in Groundwater
Policy
A. Before 196858
With the advent of the New Deal, the
national government assumed new respon-
sibilities in many areas of American life, sub-
stantially reworking federal-state relations.
But groundwater remained generally sub-
ject to state control, for several reasons:
First, large-scale extraction of groundwater
was not possible until the development of
high-speed centrifugal pumps and rural
electrification on the eve of World War II.
54. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 874-76.  See
also a recent case thoroughly exploring this issue
(albeit in the context of surface water rather than
groundwater), Trout Unlimited v. U.S. Department of
Agriculture, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Colo. 2004).
55. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 874-76; GEORGE
CAMERON COGGINS, CHARLES F. WILKINSON, JR.& JOHN D. LESHY,
FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW 549-52 (5th ed. 2002).
56. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 692-771,
esp. at 733, 753-54.
57. See WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note
3, at 244.  The Commission’s report is discussed
more fully below in Section III.B.
58. The material in this section is drawn from
a variety of sources, including SAX ET AL., supra
note 2, at 343-459; WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE,
supra note 3, at 230-293; CHARLES E. CORKER,
GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION,
NTIS No. PB 205-527 (1971) (background study
for the National Water Commission); and from
personal observations derived from my work on
these issues over more than three decades.
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Groundwater’s variability also cut sharply
against national rules.  Moreover, ground-
water rarely had an obvious interstate di-
mension that invited national involvement
— which is how the federal government as-
sumed responsibility for such major surface
water projects as Hoover Dam.  Finally,
groundwater management just lacked po-
litical sex appeal, compared to taming a wild
river through some colossal engineering
achievement.
Nevertheless, more unwittingly than by
design, federal policies put in place during
this era — including those promoting rural
electrification and cheap hydropower, and
providing federal subsidies to a variety of
agricultural crops — would soon powerfully
promote groundwater development.59
These federal policies did not displace state
control over how groundwater was used.
This is not to say, however, that states
did very much actual management of the
groundwater resource.  To the contrary, with
few exceptions, the states’ approach was
laissez-faire — to treat groundwater more
or less as a commons, to stand aside and
let pumpers have as much as they wanted.
In most places, state law purported to give
landowners rights to pump groundwater
without regard to its sustainability, or to its
effect on rights to use surface water.  As they
worked in practice, these state groundwa-
ter doctrines may be better understood as
rules of liability than as property rules of
ownership.60   In any event, these doctrines
created an illusion of unlimited private
property rights in groundwater, when in fact
the available supply of groundwater and
associated surface water was not sufficient
to satisfy such rights.
Hindsight shows this was a big mistake.
Allowing unlimited pumping and character-
izing it as a property right, when combined
with promotional federal policies, produced
predictable results.  Pumpers made large
investments in operations that depended
on groundwater, and they came to think they
had open-ended, unlimited private property
rights in the groundwater resource.  The con-
cealed nature of the resource contributed to
this problem of inflated, unrealistic expecta-
tions.  A farmer or industrial concern might
readily appreciate the difficulty of gaining ex-
clusive control over a river that flows through
many separately owned parcels of land.  Such
appreciation may be harder to come by when
water is extracted from the bowels of the earth,
even though the aquifer from which the water
is extracted may extend under many sepa-
rately owned parcels of land.  These unrealis-
tic expectations fueled the notion that the
government had limited power to regulate the
withdrawal of groundwater.
As large-scale groundwater mining be-
gan to occur after World War II, federal policy,
which was already promoting such mining,
became even more wrong-headed.  Far from
encouraging the states to take the longer
view and manage for sustainability, the fed-
eral government actively encouraged
groundwater mining.  It even invented a new
way to subsidize it, by granting a federal tax
depletion allowance to pumpers of water
from the giant Ogallala Aquifer in the High
Plains, which had little natural recharge.61
And it built projects to “rescue” groundwa-
ter miners, with additional federal subsidies.
This postponed, but could not avoid, the
inevitable day when limits on groundwater
had to be reckoned with.
59. SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 440.
60. For a discussion of this idea, see Eric
Opiela, The Rule of Capture in Texas: An Outdated
Principle Beyond Its Time, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV.
87, 90 (2002).
61. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 30.  The IRS
ruling was triggered by a court decision, United













B. A Turn to Greater Federal Involvement
Federal policy makers eventually began
to wake up to the error of their ways.  A piv-
otal moment came in 1968, when Congress
authorized federal construction of the multi-
billion dollar Central Arizona Water Project,
or CAP.62   The project that Arizona got was
not the project it originally envisioned,
which was to use imported Colorado River
water to expand irrigated acreage in central
Arizona.  Instead, the CAP was expressly
designed to be a rescue project, and no
more, for Congress prohibited CAP water
from being used “directly or indirectly for the
irrigation of lands not having a recent irri-
gation history,” except for Indian land.63
Moreover, Congress wanted this to be
Arizona’s last federal rescue project.  By 1968
it was becoming clear that the water of the
Colorado River had been over-allocated.  The
Colorado was the sole source of supply for
the CAP, and both the national government
and the other Basin interests wanted to
make sure Arizona would not be coming
back for more Colorado River water or an-
other federal bailout because it had not
been willing to control groundwater min-
ing.64   Therefore the CAP legislation specifi-
cally forbade the Secretary of the Interior
from delivering CAP water to any area in
Arizona that did not have “adequate” mea-
sures in place to “control expansion of irri-
gation from aquifers affected by the irriga-
tion in the contract service area.”65   This was
a radical departure from past practice: For
the first time ever, Congress insisted on ef-
fective state groundwater law reform as a
price for getting federal largesse.
This was a rather miraculous bit of pro-
gressive policy-making.  Even more miracu-
lously, the federal ultimatum worked.  True,
it remained in the background for ten years
as the CAP canal snaked its way across the
Arizona desert to the booming cities of
Phoenix and Tucson.  Arizona obviously was
not eager to bring up the subject, and other
Basin states (perhaps figuring they would
be next to feel this kind of federal prod to
reform their groundwater management) ap-
peared to forget about it.  Then two things
happened: Cecil Andrus became Secretary
of the Department of the Interior in 1977,
and Bruce Babbitt became governor of Ari-
zona in 1978.
In a bit of drama orchestrated with the
new Governor, Secretary Andrus announced
he was indeed prepared to enforce the con-
gressional mandate to regulate groundwa-
ter pumping.  Arizona would have to aban-
don its Wild West laissez-faire approach to
groundwater if it wanted the Secretary to
open the spigot of the two billion dollar CAP.
Babbitt then almost literally locked key rep-
resentatives of the state’s big water users in
his office for many weeks of hard bargain-
ing until they produced the 1980 ground-
water code — a detailed, complex, com-
mand-and-control reform that was anything
but laissez faire.66   All this from a state that
had always stoutly resisted any meaningful
62. See 43 U.S.C. § 1521 (2000).  The material
on the events described here is drawn from a
variety of sources, including SAX ET AL., supra note
2, at 692-705 and the other sources cited there;
MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT (1987); and STEVEN
C. SCHULTE, WAYNE ASPINALL AND THE SHAPING OF THE
AMERICAN WEST 177-226 (2002).  As Associate So-
licitor of Interior for Energy and Resources in
1977-80, I was a bit player in some of these events
and draw upon some personal observations.
63. 43 U.S.C. § 1524(a) (2000).
64. See SCHULTE, supra note 62.
65. 43 U.S.C. § 1524(c) (2000).
66. This is not to suggest the federal ultima-
tum was the only factor, for an Arizona Supreme
Court decision that made it difficult for cities to
obtain groundwater for urban growth also played
a key role.  See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 427-29;
Desmond Connall, A History of the Arizona Ground-
water Management Act, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 313.
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controls on groundwater pumping, that not
too long before had thrust free market
apostle Barry Goldwater on the national
scene, and that in that same year, 1980,
voted overwhelmingly for Ronald Reagan —
whose anti-federal regulation views were
well-known — for President.
One other important development in
the evolution of national groundwater policy
occurred in 1968. It grew out of a congres-
sional debate over whether water might be
imported into the Colorado River system
from the Columbia-Snake River system.  Led
by members of Congress from the Pacific
Northwest, opponents of importation pre-
vailed.  While the legislation Congress en-
acted called on the Secretary of the Interior
to conduct “full and complete reconnais-
sance investigations for the purpose of de-
veloping a general plan to meet the future
water needs of the Western United States,”
it prohibited “any Federal official” from un-
dertaking any study of “any plan for the im-
portation of water into the Colorado River
Basin from any other natural river drainage
basin” outside of Arizona, California, Colo-
rado and New Mexico.67   As a consolation
prize to import proponents, Congress seized
upon a favorite tactic — it set up a commis-
sion.68   While this National Water Commis-
sion grew out of the fight over importation,
it addressed water policy across the board,
including groundwater.
The Commission’s 1973 Report was
aptly titled Water Policies for the Future.  It called
for much more attention to be paid to eco-
nomic efficiencies (leading it to focus on
project costs, water pricing, and water mar-
keting); equity (leading it to call for greater
attention to Indian water rights); and envi-
ronmental quality (leading it to pay serious
attention to the environment — which was
just beginning to become a household word
in the early 1970s).
On groundwater specifically, the Com-
mission began by condemning the “misin-
formation, misunderstanding, and mysti-
cism” that surrounded the subject.69  It
worked hard to demystify the topic, tersely
expressing its key findings:
The three principal problems of
ground water law, management,
and administration are: (1) inte-
grating management of surface
water and ground water, (2) deple-
tion of ground water aquifers at
rates exceeding recharge (often
referred to as the “mining” of
ground water), and (3) impairment
of ground water quality.  Lesser,
though important, problems
are . . . accelerating collection of
ground water data together with
fuller and more meaningful inter-
pretation of it, aquifer protection,
and subsidence.70
On all three points, the Commission rather
gently criticized the miserable failure of most
states to reform their laws and policies to
address these problems.  For example, on
the first problem, the report noted that “only
recently and in only a few water-short West-
ern States has an effort been made to coor-
dinate the administration of the integrated
surface water-ground water supply.”71   On
67. 43 U.S.C. § 1511 (2000).  The original pro-
hibition was for ten years but it was extended
once, to 1988, and then was permitted to ex-
pire, apparently because the Pacific Northwest
members of Congress decided the big water
project era was over and the risk had passed.
68. National Water Commission Act, Pub. L.
No. 90-515, 82 Stat. 868; see SCHULTE, supra note
62, at 204-07, 214.
















the second, it noted that “[o]nly a few States
have squarely faced the . . . problems caused
by ground water mining.”72   On the third, the
Commission’s criticism extended to the na-
tional government as well; the report noted
that little attention had been paid to ground-
water pollution even though it has “long-term
and sometimes irreversible effects . . . [and]
the subject is of national concern.”73
Although many of the Commission’s
recommendations called simply for reform
of state laws and policies, at several points
it recommended that the federal govern-
ment be more involved.  For example:
Recommendation No. 7-6: Any
Federal agency seeking autho-
rization of a Federal water
project for an area having a us-
able ground water aquifer
should describe and evaluate
the ground water management
programs of the area.
Discussion — Congress should be
apprised of the status of ground
water management programs in
areas in which the desirability of
authorizing Federal water projects
is under consideration. Federal
agency reports on proposed water
projects should contain appropri-
ate descriptions and evaluations of
such ground water management
programs so the Congress can
judge whether or not and the ex-
tent to which progress in effective
conjunctive management of
ground water and surface water is
being made and, thus, the extent
to which that option is adequately
considered as an alternative to pro-
posed Federal projects.74
Recognizing that groundwater mining
was a “national problem,”75  the Commission
openly wrestled with various alternative
ways of dealing with it:
The Commission has given ex-
tended thought to the role of the
Federal Government in discourag-
ing ground water mining and pro-
moting prudent aquifer manage-
ment.  One possibility is preemp-
tive Federal regulation.  The Com-
mission rejects this alternative be-
cause it does not think the prob-
lem is capable of a single solution
and questions the likelihood of a
Federal agency developing mul-
tiple solutions adaptable to a vari-
ety of local conditions.76
At the same time, the Commission was
clear-eyed about the federal government’s
“direct financial interest in ground water
mining when a region suffering from over-
draft seeks a rescue operation.”77
Based on this reasoning, the Commis-
sion made the following recommendations:
Recommendation No. 7-8: The
President should issue an ex-
ecutive order directing Federal
agencies charged with respon-
sibility of water resource plan-
ning and development to include
in all pertinent studies and
project proposals a description
of the ground water resource,
whether or not ground water is
being mined and, if so, the regu-
latory and management regime
applicable to it, together with an
evaluation of that regime.
Recommendation No. 7-9: Con-
72. Id. at 232.
73. Id. at 243.
74. Id. at 238.
75. Id. at 242.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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gress should scrutinize closely
the economic justification for
water supply projects designed
to supply supplementary water
to areas that have mined ground
water and should examine the
circumstances giving rise to the
project proposal including the
presence or absence of ground
water regulation and manage-
ment, and their operation.78
The Commission also recognized the
potential seriousness of groundwater pol-
lution, and acknowledged an important fed-
eral role there too.  It called for (1) more
funding for the U.S. Geological Survey to
study and monitor groundwater quality; (2)
the federal government to take into account
state and local efforts to protect pertinent
groundwater quality in considering any fed-
eral water supply project; and (3) federal
clean water legislation to cover groundwa-
ter pollution through the same “regulatory
regime and enforcement techniques,” ap-
plied to surface water.79
Finally, the Commission addressed
what it called the “central and pervasive
problem” of the lack of basic pertinent in-
formation about groundwater, including its
availability and its connection with surface
flows.80   It noted that data are “relatively dif-
ficult to obtain, costly, and usually less pre-
cise than comparable data about the water
that is visible at the earth’s surface.”81   The
Commission did not mince words: it called
the data shortcomings  “potentially disas-
trous,” and made rather detailed recommen-
dations for how the U.S. Geological Survey
(USGS) should be adequately funded to
gather specific data on significant aquifer
systems and report the results to Federal,
State and local officials (including, specifi-
cally, state and federal courts).82   The Com-
mission also advocated that the national
Water Resources Council (since
deauthorized) use the USGS data to “formu-
late recommendations for improved ground
water management practices and transmit
its recommendations to appropriate Fed-
eral, State, and local officials.”83
In short, the Commission proclaimed
that the era of promoting the use of ground-
water without adequate regulation was, or
ought to be, over, and that more active, ef-
fective management of this vital resource was
necessary.  It called on States to do a much
better job of managing and regulating, and
while it rejected a top-down federal approach
(except to protect ground water quality), it
called for federal policies that actively pro-
moted rather than postponed solutions to
these problems.  It was a remarkably able and
prescient report, and it is noteworthy that
westerners with substantial experience in
state-level water management (in Arizona,
Montana, Oregon, Texas, and Washington)
dominated its membership.84   Coming on the
78. Id.
79. Id. at 243-44 (Recommendations Nos. 7-
10, 7-14, 7-15).
80. Id. at 245.
81. Id.
82. Id. (Recommendations Nos.7-16 through 7-20).
83. Id. (Recommendation No. 7-19).
84. The Chair, Charles Luce, had been a prominent
attorney from Washington State, general counsel to an
Indian tribe, Administrator of the Bonneville Power Ad-
ministration, and Undersecretary of the Interior under
Stewart Udall; the other six members were Howard Appling
(a former Oregon state official who had worked in the
agricultural industry), James Ellis (attorney from Seattle
with extensive experience in state and local government
issues), Roger Ernst (former Arizona state engineer, wa-
ter commissioner, land commissioner and water district
official), Ray K. Linsley (Engineering Professor at Stanford
and consultant to state and federal agencies), James E.
Murphy (Montana attorney active on water issues at the
state and interstate level), and Josiah Wheat (Texas at-
torney and state and water district official).  WATER POLI-
CIES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 3, at iv-v.  Its staff and con-
sultants included many westerners experienced in state













heels of the 1968 CAP legislation, it pointed
the way toward better groundwater manage-
ment, with the federal government playing a
constructive role.
C. The Current Scenario
It is, frankly, a pity that the Com-
mission’s recommendations have mostly
not been implemented.  Delay in address-
ing these issues is costly, as economies in-
creasingly rely on unsustainable water prac-
tices and expectations harden in resistance
to change.  As the Commission itself noted
with respect to the integration of ground
and surface water management, “when the
coordination effort comes late - after an
economy has been developed in reliance on
two different legal systems for one integrated
supply — achieving coordinated adminis-
tration is very difficult.”85
But the Commission’s recommenda-
tions remain viable. This was demonstrated
when, a quarter-century later, another con-
gressionally chartered blue-ribbon commis-
sion revisited western water management.
The 1998 report of this Western Water Policy
Review Advisory Commission essentially
updated and refined much of the work of its
predecessor, reaffirming its key conclusions.
Among other things, the new Commission
recommended that Congress “require
state . . . regulation of [groundwater] with-
drawals as a condition of federal financial
assistance for the construction of new wa-
ter storage projects.” 86   It also asked Con-
gress to “scrutinize proposals for water
projects in areas with groundwater mining,
especially noting the presence or absence
of groundwater regulation and manage-
ment.”87   Finally, it called on all federal agen-
cies with responsibilities in the water area
to be aware of  “associated groundwater re-
sources and their current management, in-
cluding . . . rates of depletion.”88
Now, fast-forward five more years, to the
Bush Administration’s major water policy pro-
nouncement, Water 2025.89   It contains some
nice rhetoric and has some sensible, construc-
tive elements. But on groundwater, the Ad-
ministration is basically missing in action.
For example, Water 2025 does not iden-
tify groundwater depletion as a priority water
management problem in the west.  It does
not mention the problem of ignoring connec-
tions between groundwater and surface wa-
ter. And it does not include improved ground-
water management or replenishment in its tool
kit.  Indeed, its only statement on the subject
is the tepid promise that the U.S. Geological
Survey “will enhance groundwater monitor-
ing . . . in critical areas of the West.”90
One does not have to look too far for
an explanation of the Bush Administration’s
modesty.  Its policy is replete with statements
like these:
− “Since 1866, federal water law and
policy has deferred to states in the
allocation and administration of
water within their boundaries.
This policy will be honored and
enhanced by Water 2025.”
− Decisions to address “the complex
water needs of the West . . . can-
not and should not be driven from
the federal level.”
− “Water 2025 can only work if it is
85. Id. at 233.
86. WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COM-
MISSION, WATER IN THE WEST: THE CHALLENGE FOR THE
NEXT CENTURY, p. 6-23 (1998).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See U.S. Department of the Interior, Water
2025: Providing Water for the West, at http://www.doi.gov/
initiatives/water2025 (last updated June 21, 2004).
90. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, WATER 2025:
PREVENTING CRISES AND CONFLICT IN THE WEST 18, avail-
able at http://www.doi.gov/water2025/Water2025
.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
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implemented in accordance with
state law.”91
While the Administration at least acknowl-
edged that the federal government “built
many of the water storage and delivery sys-
tems in the arid west,”92  its virtual silence
on groundwater, and its zeal to respect state
law, assumes that states will solve ground-
water problems by themselves.  Experience
does not support this assumption.
Groundwater mining, for example, is
fundamentally created by and tolerated
through state law.  The artificial bifurcation
between groundwater and surface water is
a problem solely created by state law, be-
cause it is not tolerated in federal law, as
the Cappaert decision illustrates.93   Arizona’s
pre-CAP experience is typical - when states
are given absolute supremacy over ground-
water management, the result in many
places will be continued relentless mining
of groundwater and the destruction of dwin-
dling supplies of riparian habitat so that,
over time, groundwater depletion reaches
crisis proportions, both for water supply and
for aquatic ecosystems.  There are many
other examples.94
Although groundwater in much of the
United States is not being managed very
well, states will continue to have a primary
role in its management.  Unilateral, top-
down federal solutions are no more likely
to be adopted or to work here than in any
other aspect of water policy.  But as the
National Water Commission recognized, the
federal government has a constructive role
to play.  The Arizona experience shows how
it can encourage and sometimes even re-
quire states to do better. Unfortunately,
Water 2025 seems to ignore that approach,
making it a missed opportunity to improve
management of a vital natural resource.
Water 2025 also reflects federal fiscal
shortsightedness. Again, the National Wa-
ter Commission saw the problem clearly,
recognizing that groundwater mining is of
national concern, not so much from the fact
that the resource may be ultimately de-
pleted, although that is a problem, but from
the fact that the depletion is unplanned, and
the future is not provided for.  As disaster
approaches, the Federal Government is
likely to be implored to step in with a res-
cue project, to furnish a supplementary wa-
ter supply at taxpayers’ expense to save an
economy established in reliance on impru-
dent overuse of groundwater.95
91. Id. at 1-3.
92. Id. at 11.
93. See, discussion, supra Section II.A.
94. Consider the State of Wyoming’s failure to
address the problem of disposing of vast quantities of
groundwater that are pumped in coal bed methane
extraction.  GARY BRYNER, COALBED METHANE DEVELOPMENT
IN THE INTERMOUNTAIN WEST 13-16 (Natural Resources Law
Center, University of Colorado School of Law, 2002),
available at http://www.colorado.edu/law/centers/nrlc/
publications/CBM_Primer.pdf (last visited Nov. 14,
2004).  See also, JOSHUA SKOV & NANCY MYERS, EASY MONEY,
HIDDEN COSTS: APPLYING PRECAUTIONARY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
TO COALBED METHANE IN THE POWDER RIVER BASIN (Science
and Environmental Health Network, June 2004), avail-
able at www.sehn.org/pdf/cbm.pdf (last visited Nov. 9,
2004).  This report estimates that coal bed methane
development could pump 40 million acre-feet of
groundwater, causing a several hundred-foot drop in
the water table and affecting 5000 water wells.  Con-
sider also Nevada’s limited and mostly ineffectual re-
sponse to huge groundwater withdrawals associated
with hard-rock mining — a one million acre-feet draw-
down in the Humboldt Basin in Nevada alone.  One,
the Barrick Goldstrike mine, pumps about 80,000 acre-
feet a year from its pit, and when it backfills after min-
ing ceases it will likely severely reduce surface flows in
the Humboldt River to create the second largest res-
ervoir (after Lake Mead) in Nevada.  See, e.g., SAX ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 361-62.
95. WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 3, at
232.  Of course, even when a state has a groundwa-
ter management scheme in place that adequately
addresses how shortfalls in supply should be allo-













IV. An Appropriate Federal Role
Arizona is managing its groundwater
much better than it was before the federal
government helped engineer its reform.  The
Arizona experience suggests the right path
for federal policy — to use a mixture of in-
formation-gathering, carrots (federal dol-
lars), sticks (federal claims of water rights
and enforcement of federal regulatory laws
like the Endangered Species Act), and per-
suasion (conditions in federal reclamation
contracts and federal land use permits) to
move the states toward more active man-
agement of groundwater.
As the National Water Commission
emphasized, an essential step is simply
gathering information.  The U.S. Geological
Survey operates about 7200 stream-flow
gauges around the country, and in my ex-
perience, its support role in this regard is
widely accepted.  But the states have never
advocated for — indeed, they may have qui-
etly resisted — a comparable federal role in
groundwater.  I believe this is because of
their concern that federal information-gath-
ering will ultimately lead to federal displace-
ment of their primacy over groundwater.
This extreme short-sightedness has resulted
in a great disparity in the amount of federal
dollars invested in assessing and monitor-
ing aquifers compared to their importance
to the nation in supplying drinking water for
a large proportion of the country.96
In much of the West, the federal gov-
ernment operates a giant plumbing system
of storage and delivery projects.97   This sys-
tem has great potential for facilitating
groundwater banking, which is emerging as
an essential tool for progressive water man-
agement in many areas.98   Moreover, the
federal government’s power to contract for
the use of this water, including when it
seeps into aquifers, gives clear opportunity
to promote better management of ground-
water, including restoration of associated
stream systems.99
The assertion of federal claims to
groundwater may sometimes lead to negoti-
ated settlements that improve management
of groundwater and related surface water with
benefits to non-federal as well as federal in-
terests.  Around the Lummi Indian Reserva-
tion north of Seattle, where Indians and a
rapidly growing number of non-Indians
pump groundwater from a common pool,
and salt water intrusion from nearby Puget
Sound threatens all, federal claims to ground-
water on behalf of the Indians can help forge
a solution to the common problem by forc-
ing non-Indians to the negotiating table.100
Elsewhere, federal claims to groundwater may
help spur states to manage water in a way
that acknowledges the interface between
ground and surface water.101
for assistance.  Thus, Idaho agricultural interests
have been exploring how they might obtain federal
funds to ameliorate pain caused by applying Idaho’s
priority system to curtail groundwater pumping by
farmers in order to protect senior water rights in
surface springs and the Snake River.  See Jennifer
Sandmann, Idaho Debates Idling Farms for Spring Water,
THE TIMES-NEWS (Twin Falls, Idaho), August 19, 2004
(on file with West-Northwest) (originally accessed at
http://www.magicvalley.com); Rocky Barker, Idaho
Farmer May Be Asked to Dry Up 100,000 Acres, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Sept. 3, 2004, Local Section, at 6.
96. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER RESOURCES
OF THE UNITED STATES, available at http://water.usgs.gov/
programs.html (last updated Aug. 12, 2004).
97. See SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 651-57.
98. See id. at 431-59.  See also several reports on con-
junctive use prepared by The Natural Heritage Institute,
found at http://www.n-h-i.org/Projects/WaterResources/
ConjUse/ConjunctiveUse.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
99. Id.
100. SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 862-63.
101. See the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in
the Gila River Adjudication case, supra note 16, recognizing a
federal reserved right to groundwater, and its closely re-
lated decision, In re General Adjudication of Gila River System,
198 Ariz. 330, 334, 9 P.3d 1069, 1073 (2000), recognizing a
test for defining sub-flow of surface water that “comports
with hydrological reality, as it is currently understood.”
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Sometimes the federal prod may not
be needed. Colorado has developed, with-
out overt federal intervention, a sophisti-
cated system of managing groundwater and
surface water in an integrated way that puts
it miles ahead of any other western state.102
The threat of salinity intrusion and aquifer
contamination along Southern California’s
coastal plain has led to some remarkably
sophisticated groundwater management
there, again without significant federal in-
volvement.103   (But California is schizo-
phrenic — in its great Central Valley there is
precious little management of groundwa-
ter.104 )  Land subsidence around Houston
from unregulated groundwater pumping led
to some modest legal reform, at least on
paper, of Texas’s wild and woolly rule of cap-
ture — the “absolute ownership in the land-
owner” principle of groundwater law.105
But looking across the entire land-
scape, progress without federal prodding is
more the exception than the rule.  In most
places the federal government is needed,
as in Central Arizona, to be a catalyst for
constructive change in groundwater man-
agement. Its tough stance there was driven
by interstate politics, uncharacteristic fed-
eral fiscal prudence, and progressive lead-
ership.  A more common rationale for more
recent federal intervention in state ground-
water management has been to preserve
biodiversity.  Consider the Edwards Aquifer
in south-central Texas.  Even as pumping
from this vital supply (the sole source of wa-
ter for the Nation’s ninth largest city, San
Antonio) increased dramatically, Texas stub-
bornly resisted regulation.  The aquifer dis-
charges into some springs which support
several endangered species listed and pro-
tected under federal law.  Litigation to en-
force that law eventually, if slowly, led Texas
to begin to come to grips with managing the
aquifer to protect not only the species’ fu-
ture, but also that of one of its great cities.106
Much the same thing is happening on
the Platte River, where endangered species
concerns are driving Colorado, Nebraska and
Wyoming toward better management of the
River and its associated aquifers.  A recent
editorial in the Denver Post underscored the
importance of the federal government driv-
ing the solution, and noted that the endan-
gered species concerns are forcing Nebraska
to stop “ignor[ing] the physical reality that
excessive pumping of shallow aquifers near
a river reduces the river’s water levels . . .
[which is a] big problem on the Platte.”107
A final example involves the San Pedro,
a small desert river in southern Arizona, pleas-
ant enough to the untrained eye but spectacu-
lar to biologists and bird-watchers - a remnant
of pre-settlement Arizona, before groundwa-
ter pumping and surface diversions dried up
nearly all Arizona’s major rivers.108   The San
Pedro corridor is one of the largest surviving
expanses of southwestern cottonwood-willow
riparian forests, and is important habitat for
102. See, e.g., SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 361, 401-402.
103. SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 446-59; See
WILLIAM BLOMQUIST, DIVIDING THE WATERS: GOVERNING
GROUNDWATER IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (1992).
104. SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 458.
105.See Friendswood Development Co. v. Smith-
Southwest Industries, 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1978); SAX
ET AL., supra note 2, at 367, 430-31.
106.See, e.g., SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 577-
82; GLENNON, supra note 6, at 87-97.
107.Editorial, A Solution on Platte River Fight, DENVER
POST, Aug. 9, 2004, at B7, available at 2004 WL 59330297.
See also Bureau of Reclamation, Platte River Recovery Pro-
gram EIS, at http://www.usbr.gov/pmts/groundwater/
allprojects/platte_river.htm (last updated July 1, 2003).
108. The facts referred to in the discussion of the San
Pedro are derived generally from GLENNON, supra note 6;
see also COMM’N ON ENVTL. COOPERATION, RIBBON OF LIFE: AN
AGENDA FOR PRESERVING TRANSBOUNDARY MIGRATORY BIRD HABI-
TAT ON THE UPPER SAN PEDRO RIVER (1999) [hereinafter RIBBON
OF LIFE], available at http://www.cec.org/pubs_docs/docu-














millions of migratory birds, making it a world-
class showcase of biological diversity.  Birder’s
Digest named the area the premier
birdwatching site in the country.109
It is an international stream, arising in
Mexico and flowing northward into Arizona
where it eventually joins the Gila River.  The
San Pedro sits atop a large aquifer that con-
tains perhaps 50 million acre-feet of water.
Nearby are an army base, Fort Huachuca, and
one of Arizona’s fastest growing cities, Sierra
Vista.  The City, the Army, farmers, and oth-
ers all pump groundwater.  The pumping aims
a loaded gun at the stream-flow and the ri-
parian corridor.  The resulting overdraft will,
unless checked, inexorably extinguish the
stream and its rich riparian habitat.  State law
has been inadequate to protect the riparian
corridor because the State has been slow to
recognize the connection between ground-
water and surface water, and because the
area is outside the primary regulatory ambit
of the 1980 groundwater code.110
Formerly in private hands, the legacy
of a Mexican land grant, the riparian corri-
dor is now in federal ownership as a result
of a three-way state/private/federal trade
engineered by then-Governor Babbitt in the
mid-1980s.  In 1988, Congress made it the
nation’s first Riparian National Conservation
Area, and it is now part of the Bureau of
Land Management’s National Landscape
Conservation System.111
The federal legislation expressly re-
serves water as a matter of federal law to
protect the riparian corridor.  It also contains
the unusual command to the Secretary of
the Interior to “take steps necessary to pro-
tect” federally reserved water rights, includ-
ing “filing . . . a claim for the quantification
of such rights in any present or future ap-
propriate stream adjudications.”112  The fed-
eral right has been asserted in the massive
Gila River general stream adjudication (filed
a quarter of a century ago), but the proceed-
ings are going forward at a glacial pace.113
Still, the federal water rights, the presence
of endangered species and Fort Huachuca
make the national government a major
player in, and a proponent of, protecting the
stream and riparian corridor.
Apparently frustrated with the pace of
the adjudication, last year Congress
stepped in again, with a little-noticed pro-
vision buried in the 2004 National Defense
Authorization Act.114   On the one hand, it
clarified that the consultation process of
section 7 of the Endangered Species Act did
not require consideration of water consump-
tion by non-federal entities outside Fort
Huachuca, in determining whether federal
groundwater pumping would be likely to
jeopardize endangered species.115   On the
other hand, and more important, it directed
the Secretary of the Interior to “prepare . . .
a report on water use management and con-
servation measures that have been imple-
mented and are needed to restore and
maintain the sustainable yield of the re-
gional aquifer by and after September 30,
2011.”116   The report, due by the end of this
calendar year, is to:
set forth measurable annual goals
for the reduction of the overdrafts
of the groundwater of the regional
aquifer, to identify specific water
use management and conserva-
tion measures to facilitate the
109. See GLENNON, supra note 6, at 51-69.
110. See, e.g., RIBBON OF LIFE, supra note 108.
111. See 16 U.S.C. § 460xx-6 (2000) [San Pedro
Riparian National Conservation Area].
112. Id. § 460xx-1(d).
113. See supra note 101.
114. Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 321, 117 Stat.
1392, 1437-39 (2003).
115. Id. § 321(a)(1), 117 Stat. at 1437.
116. Id. § 321(c)(1), 117 Stat. at 1438.
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achievement of such goals, and to
identify impediments in current
Federal, State, and local laws that
hinder efforts . . . to mitigate wa-
ter usage in order to restore and
maintain the sustainable yield of
the regional aquifer by and after
September 30, 2011.117
The report is supposed to set out the “net
quantity of water withdrawn from and re-
charged to the regional aquifer” in the most
recent one-year period,118  identify annual
overdraft reduction goals each year from
2005 through 2011 “to achieve sustainable
yield,”119  and contain an “allocation of re-
sponsibility for the achievement of such re-
duction among” water users in the basin.120
It must also address monitoring and verifi-
cation activities, and provide for annual
progress reports.121   While Congress did not
mandate that the recommendations in the
report be implemented as a matter of fed-
eral law, it expressed the “sense of Congress”
that “any future appropriations” of federal
money to the local water management part-
nership “should take into account whether
the partnership has met its annual goals for
overdraft reduction.”122
Here, Congress has combined the car-
rot and the stick.  Interestingly, it does not
rely on federal claims of water rights, even
though the San Pedro has an express fed-
eral water right.  The “stick” of choice here is
instead the threat of enforcement of federal
regulatory laws like the ESA.  This may be
because the ESA is so powerful where listed
endangered species are affected123  or per-
haps because the process of identifying,
adjudicating, and enforcing Winters rights is
so long, complex and expensive.  The San
Pedro experience also suggests that the as-
sertion of a Winters property right may be
less politically palatable to state and local
interests than the assertion of federal regu-
latory authority.  Indeed, the Winters doctrine
— the principal basis for federal water rights
— has long caused substantial state dis-
comfiture.124   It may be that in some, per-
haps many circumstances, states may be
more accepting of federal regulation than
they are of federal assertion of property
rights in natural resources they see as within
their purview.
Finally, the San Pedro may also illus-
trate, in the end, that solutions may not
come easily.  The ESA may drive the pro-
cess, but ultimately further federal carrots
might be necessary, in the form of funds for
measurement and scientific modeling, for
conservation, for water reuse, and for plumb-
ing facilities both to better manage local
supplies and, possibly, to import supplies
from outside.
V. Conclusion
As Aldous Huxley said, facts do not
cease to exist simply because they are ig-
nored.125   The nation and its constituent
states have not fully faced up to serious
groundwater problems.  Robert Glennon’s
stories of depletion of groundwater and as-
sociated surface water are grim reminders
117. Id. § 321(c)(2), 117 Stat. at 1438.
118. Id. § 321(c)(3)(A), 117 Stat. at 1438.
119. Id. § 321(c)(3)(B), 117 Stat. at 1438.
120. Id. § 321(c)(3)(C), 117 Stat. at 1438.
121. Id. § 321(d), 117 Stat. at 1438-39.
122. Id. § 321(f), 117 Stat. at 1439.
123. In many situations there may be enough
of a federal connection to groundwater overdraft
to trigger the ESA section 7 consultation pro-
cess.  This can be a more accessible tool than the
direct enforcement of “take” of endangered spe-
cies under section 9.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000).
124.  SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 781-866, esp. 815-17.
125. Aldous Huxley, A Note on Dogma, in PROPER
STUDIES 205 (1927).  The quotation is available at
http://www.quotationspage.com/subjects/facts













126. GLENNON, supra note 6, passim.
127. See sources cited in SAX ET AL., supra note
2, at 428.
128. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37-90-
103(10.7) (2004); SAX ET AL., supra note 2, at 361.
of a resource in trouble.126   Droughts of re-
cent years — possibly long-term, possibly
exacerbated by humanly induced climate
change — is leading to more groundwater
extraction, more depletion, and more ad-
verse effects on surface water rights and
ecosystems.
Grappling with these questions is not
easy.  Groundwater management can be
staggeringly complex, as anyone can attest
who has ever waded through page after
page of mind-numbing detail in the Ari-
zona groundwater code,127  or struggled
with the definition of “not-nontributary
groundwater” along Colorado’s Front
Range.128   While the scientific, technical
and legal challenges are daunting, there is
room for optimism, if the federal govern-
ment is willing to assume a more active
role.  There is much at stake.
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